

person who was more hamstrung by his inability to write.

However, it seems probable that the time which he spent at the Burghölzli laid the foundation for a good many of the ideas which later became keystones of Jungian thought. First, there was experimental confirmation for his notion that the mind was, or could be, divided into differing parts which he tended to personify. Second, the idea occurred to him that there was a substratum of mind common to all men which was the source of mythological, cosmogonic notions. Third, he conceived that this mythological material had a positive function in giving meaning and significance to man's existence; perhaps as a compensation for his actual insignificance, just as the grandiose delusions of schizophrenics compensated for their failure in life. Fourth was the idea that such material was not only compensatory, but prospective; that is, forward-looking in its application. A myth might be an attempt on the part of the mind itself at self-healing; that is, at creating a better adaptation in the future. Fifth, this point of view implied that not all dreams, phantasies and similar material could be interpreted in terms of the subject's infantile past, as Freud would have it. Nor could it be maintained that the creative energy of the mind – the libido – was wholly sexual. Whilst hysterical neuroses were generally connected with a sexual disturbance, schizophrenia was concerned with a more general failure in adaption to external reality. The connection between the inner world of the subject and his whole view of the external world could not be thought of as merely a sexual phenomenon.

Starr, A. (1973) 'Archetypes and the
Collective Unconscious' Jung. London: Routledge

3 Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious

The word 'archetype' has passed into more or less general use; but it is extraordinarily hard to give an adequate definition of the term as used by Jung. In the last chapter, I drew attention to Jung's conception of a 'collective unconscious' responsible for the spontaneous production of myths, visions, religious ideas, and certain varieties of dream which were common to various cultures and periods of history. I instanced the so-called hero myths as illustrating what was meant; and pointed out that such a myth could be held to be an exposition, in fairy-tale language, of a child's progress from infancy to maturity. Although the basic essentials of this progress are held in common by all mankind, since every child is born of a mother, has to grow up, attain independence, and win a mate, yet the details of such a progress will vary from culture to culture. Thus, the English would tend to portray the hero as controlled, courteous, reluctant to show emotion, honest, and straightforward; a 'gentleman' in fact, or a 'parfit gentil knyght'. A Greek hero, on the other hand, might be painted as being much cleverer; a trickster who would not shun deceit, would use guile to defeat his enemies, and who would not necessarily disdain displays of emotion when the situation warranted it. Odysseus is just as brave as any English Galahad; but Homer describes him as *πολύτροπος* – the man of many wiles. It is, therefore, as if there was some kind of flexible mould underlying the idea of the hero, which could not be clearly seen until a culture had filled it with a myth, and therefore to some extent rigidified it by defining it, but which itself was indefin-

able. When linguistic analysts study the relations between different languages, they not infrequently come across words from two or more languages which are so similar that they are bound to postulate a parent word from which each was clearly derived. Yet the parent language may be lost; so that the existence of the parent word is hypothetical. The archetype corresponds to the parent word, or to the flexible mould. It does not correspond to the actual manifestation as produced by any particular culture; yet it underlies all manifestations produced by all cultures. The nearest one can come to it is by parallel and comparison. *Das Ding an sich* – the thing in itself – will always escape precise definition. This, I think, is what Jung means when he writes: 'Again and again I encounter the mistaken notion that an archetype is determined in regard to its content, in other words that it is a kind of unconscious idea (if such an expression be permissible). It is necessary to point out once more that archetypes are not determined as regards their content, but only as regards their form, and then only to a very limited degree. A primordial image is determined as to its content only when it has become conscious and is therefore filled out with the material of conscious experience.'¹

This formulation disposes of the accusation sometimes brought against Jung that he was a Lamarckian, believing in the inheritance of acquired characteristics. What is inherited is a predisposition, not an idea; a predisposition to create significant myths out of the common stuff of day-to-day human experience; just as one might say that a human being inherits a predisposition to react emotionally to the opposite sex. It is true that in other contexts Jung writes as if he did believe that culture affected these predispositions; more especially when he postulates racial differences in the collective unconscious: but these seem to be later accretions. The origi-

nal idea that archetypes are inherited predispositions is no more Lamarckian than to say that the sexual instinct is inherited, or the structure of the cerebellum. Some confusion exists in that the word 'archetype', or the adjective 'archetypal' may refer to a situation, a figure or image, or to an idea of symbolic significance. Thus, when a hero meets a typical impasse, a ford which has to be crossed, a thick hedge which has to be pierced, a wall of fire which has to be penetrated, we are dealing with both an archetypal figure and an archetypal situation. Archetypes can also be equivalent to abstract ideas; the Christian Cross, for example, representing the death of the hero, on the one hand, and also an irrational union of opposites on the other.

Archetypes are felt to possess immense emotional significance. They are, if one likes to put it that way, typical human experience; but experience raised to what is felt to be of superhuman, or even cosmic significance. All human beings, at least in Jung's view, experience life archetypically, at least at times. Perhaps the easiest way of appreciating this is to take some typical human experience like sex. Sex can be the mere slaking of an 'all-too-human' appetite. (Jung is fond of phrases like 'all-too-human', and to a minor extent may merit the Freudian accusation of regarding sex *per se* as distasteful). On the other hand, sex can be experienced as transcendental love, a 'divine' afflatus, the most important thing in life. Anyone who has ever been passionately, head-over-heels in love will recognize the difference. Similarly, great plays raise the experience of the characters within them to a higher level than the merely personal. In the time of Shakespeare, one device for doing this was to make the characters 'royal'. The conflicts of a Prince of Denmark, a Cleopatra, or a King of England, however banal they may appear on critical analysis, are likely, on the stage, to take on a more than

human, a mythic, an archetypal significance. Even more is this so in opera, where a very ordinary, and all too often confused story, becomes a vehicle for heroic passions, great events, and desperate tragedies, because the figures are transfigured and transmuted through the music, which lends them a significance they might not otherwise possess. It is not really surprising that Wagner, attempting the superhuman task of creating a completely new synthesis of poetry, music, and drama, should have been forced to turn to mythology (in the 'Ring') to lend his figures the timeless significance he needed. Indeed, as Robert Donington has demonstrated, the 'Ring' is a happy hunting-ground for Jungians.³ In his autobiography, Jung, describing the progress of his own self-analysis, refers to archetypes as speaking 'the language of high rhetoric, even of bombast', a style which he found embarrassing. But, in the hands of a master like Shakespeare, because of his poetic gift, characters can speak in such language and enthrall rather than embarrass us. Poetry, like music, can transmute the mud of the banal into the gold of the transcendent. One of Jung's central ideas was that modern man had become alienated from this mythopoetic substratum of his being, and that therefore his life lacked meaning and significance for him. The task of analysis was to put him in touch once again with this absolute or 'divine ground', as Aldous Huxley would have called it, by means of analysing the subject's dreams. This point of view is perfectly coherent and sensible, provided one accepts the premise that what is wrong with neurotics is not primarily a disturbance in their sexual lives or a failure to make adequate personal relationships, but rather a loss of the sense that there is any meaning in existence. Modern 'existential' analysts are preoccupied with exactly the same problem; but seldom seem to recognize that Jung anticipated them.

The existence of the mythological substratum to human experience is recognized by analysts of entirely different theoretical orientation, though they would use another nomenclature. The 'object-relations' school of analysts refer to 'internal objects' which are presumed to be images of parents and other significant figures, derived from the infant's earliest experience, 'introjected', that is, enshrined within the psyche, and influencing all his subsequent experience of actual people in the external world. For example, let us suppose that an infant has been mishandled or neglected by his mother; and what mother is so perfect that she might never neglect or mishandle her infant? The baby will enshrine or introject a picture of the mother as a witch-like figure, a potential persecutor who is likely to damage him. On the other hand, when his mother is fulfilling all his needs, she will appear as a kind of protective goddess, a 'perfect' provider, comforter, and giver of love. Kleinian analysts write of the 'paranoid-schizoid' position as the earliest stage of emotional development of the infant; and the main feature of this stage is the separation of images of the mother into wholly 'good' and wholly 'bad'; images which can be personified as the Virgin Mary on the one hand, and an evil witch on the other. That these images exist as active factors in the human psyche is not in doubt. Anyone who has ever worked in a child guidance clinic will have had the experience of interviewing a child, hearing his description of his mother, and wondering what terrible figure will follow the child into the consulting room. When she actually appears, she is as likely as not to be a mild, kindly, ordinary sort of person, quite remote from the child's phantasy picture of her. On a collective scale, it is obvious that the same process of projecting images quite remote from reality occurred in the witch-hunts of the Middle Ages, when thousands of innocent old women were tortured and

burnt because they were seen as evil persecutors. In Jungian terminology, such images are archetypal. They lie behind the child's actual experience of his actual parents. Put another way, one might say that these images represent the entirely subjective, and very primitive, needs and fears of the child, without much reference to external reality. These images tend to be reactivated in extreme situations. Thus, when men feel threatened by external events like the Black Death, they will regress to a primitive, 'paranoid-schizoid' stage of development, and seek for scapegoats whom they can blame for their predicament, whether these be the Jews, or anti-Christ, or witches. At the same time, they will call upon the Mother of God to save them, and will fall for the utterances of any leader who promises deliverance, seeing him as an idealized saviour without blemish. It is not difficult to prove the existence of an inner world of highly irrational images; and whether these are called archetypes or internal objects hardly seems to matter. Kleinian analysts would derive these images, at any rate for the most part, from the infant's actual experience; whereas Jung would have maintained that they were derived more from inborn predisposition in the manner outlined above. Interesting though this question may be theoretically, it is hardly relevant in practice. What does matter is how this inner world of internal objects or archetypal images is integrated into ordinary human existence. The Kleinian answer (and the Freudian, in so far as Freud recognized the 'inner world' problem) would presumably be that, in the ordinary course of emotional development, provided that the individual succeeds in making really satisfying emotional relationships with real people in the external world, the internalized images lose their emotional charge, and are only regressively reactivated under special circumstances; for instance, in disaster or bereavement. Jung, on the other hand, would

have maintained that a place had to be found for the emotional charge attached to these images other than in interaction with the external world. Jung's answer to this is of course a religious one, although it is not an answer in terms of any particular variety of dogmatic creed or conventional system.

One difficulty which will occur to many people in this connection is as follows. We may accept the idea that it is only through myth that a man feels his life to have meaning and significance. Through the cold eyes of objectivity, no single individual matters very much. We are all insignificant atoms, not very different one from another, and most of us will be forgotten within a few years of our deaths. But if a man feels that he is assisting the sun in its daily transit, or that he is a child of God, or that he is destined for eternal life, or that he has a message for mankind, or that he is really a Prince, defrauded of his inheritance by the plots of Freemasons, then he is in a position to overcome his sense of his own futility. As will be perceived, I am putting forward suggestions as to possible myths which can be variously regarded either as paranoid delusions or as religious beliefs. As I pointed out in the last chapter, one weakness of the Jungian conception is that it fails to distinguish between psychotic and normal. I think that Kleinians and Freudians would argue that religious beliefs are as unnecessary as delusions, provided a man has sufficiently rewarding interpersonal relationships. After all, they might allege, where does the average person find his sense of his own worth? As a child, if he is loved sufficiently by his parents, he never questions the point of life or the meaning of his own existence; and he incorporates (introjects) so firm a sense of his own value because of what his parents have given him, that he continues throughout his life to feel significant. Moreover, when he marries, he will be sure of his value to his spouse, and later to his

children. What is the need, in the normal person, for all this seeking after the significance of life, the meaning of existence? Surely it is only to the schizoid, alienated person that such questions occur. It is true that the infant starts life with an inner, subjective world which is at variance with the external objective world. But surely, in the normal person, the subjective and the objective intermingle sufficiently for there not to be too enormous a gap between them. We feel, and should feel, irrational about those we love; but our irrational inner world is sufficiently catered for by the irrational element in all emotional interpersonal relationships.

As we shall see, there is something in this charge. It may well be maintained that Jung was not only generalizing from his own experience, but also from the experience of a highly specialized group of patients to whom his point of view particularly appealed because of their likeness to himself. On the other hand, it may also be argued, as Jung did, that in practically every age except our own, man's need to find a home for his inner world in a religion was universally acknowledged; and that many people were suffering from a sense of futility just because they lacked a myth. Moreover, Jung would have pointed to the totally irrational belief in political systems, be it Communism or Fascism or National Socialism, as greatly inferior forms of religious belief which took hold of men's minds, willy-nilly, just because they had discarded the beliefs of their ancestors which were actually far more 'reasonable'. It is more sensible, and probably less likely to do harm to other people, if one worships God rather than Mao-Tse Tung or the State in spite of the Inquisition and the wars of religion. The need to worship something or somebody is, however, not to be extirpated; or, if it is, leaves a man with a sense of futility and a consequent liability to fall for all kinds of totally absurd beliefs, whether these be political, or such

phantasies as spiritualism, astrology, theosophy, and the like.

This is a book about Jung, and not about the ideas of the present author, but I cannot avoid mentioning, at this juncture, that I think Jung was right in supposing that interpersonal relationships cannot contain the whole of man's inner world. In another book I have argued that man's infancy is intrinsically frustrating; and that it is this fact which makes him restlessly creative, searching for 'ideal' solutions, whether these be in the shape of scientific world-views, philosophies, religions, or the integrative patterns of art.¹

We shall revert at a later point in this book to the more general effect of Jungian analysis and the attainment of what Jung called a religious attitude, albeit without subscribing to a generally accepted faith. At this point we must revert to a discussion of some of the more important archetypal figures themselves.

I hope I have made it clear above that Jung is perfectly justified in drawing attention to the fact that, in addition to the child's image and experience of his actual mother as a real person, one has to take into account 'archetypal' images of the good and bad mother which, as it were, become projected upon the real mother in such a way that she may appear as a kind of divinity or else as a kind of witch. In a paper on the mother archetype, Jung gives a list of ways in which this may manifest itself, ranging from mother goddesses to more abstract things which are associated with fertility, protection, containment, and the like. Since maternal protection (overprotection) can also be a threat to developing individuality, the negative aspects of the maternal archetype are expressed in such symbols as witches, dragons, devouring and entwining animals and situations, and even the grave, or the sea in which the individual may drown.

As I pointed out in the first chapter, the father plays a much smaller part in Jungian psychology than in Freudian (compare the entries under 'mother' with those under 'father' in the index of *Symbols of Transformation*). But the father also has his archetypal aspects. As in the case of the mother, the image has opposite faces. On the one hand, the archetypal father is 'the representative of the spirit, whose function it is to oppose pure instinctuality';⁴ a sublime deity, 'the symbol of the most complete sexual repression'.⁵ On the other, he is the devil, 'the symbol of sexual lust'.⁶ In an early paper 'The Father in the Destiny of the Individual' written when Jung was still under the influence of Freud, though later considerably revised, Jung comes close to what might now be considered a Kleinian point of view. He writes that 'The parental influence, dating from the early infantile period, is repressed and sinks into the unconscious, but is not eliminated; by invisible threads it directs the apparently individual workings of the maturing mind. Like everything that has fallen into the unconscious, the infantile situation still sends up dim, premonitory feelings, feelings of being secretly guided by other worldly influences. Normally these feelings are not referred back to the father, but to a positive or negative deity'.⁷ In this passage, Jung appears to consider that the archetypal images take origin from infantile experience, rather than being based upon inherited predispositions. If Jung had continued to maintain this point of view about the origin of archetypal images, he would have gained wider acceptance for his psychology.

The disagreement as to the origin of 'internal objects' or archetypes is mirrored by the disagreement between biologists as to what is learned and what is innate. Not all adaptive behaviour is the result of learned experience. There are inherited predispositions, probably imbedded in the structure of the nervous system, which incline

animals to behave in certain ways. One example is of the male salticid spider. In approaching a female, he has to perform a specific ritual courtship dance in such a way that the female responds in a sexual way. If he performed his dance in any other way, she would immediately eat him. But he has no opportunity in his short life to gain any information about what a female of his own species looks like, nor what movements he must perform to inhibit her feeding reactions and to stimulate her specific mating responses.⁸ Therefore his performance of his dance must be a behaviour pattern which is largely innate.

It seems highly probable, though difficult to prove, that the human infant is born with a number of innate predispositions to which to respond; for example, parents, the opposite sex, and rather basic human situations like having children, separating from parents in adolescence, and finally, death. These innate predispositions might be compared to the 'innate releasing mechanisms' (IRMs) described by Tinbergen in animals. Many animals have a built-in tendency to respond in a fairly stereotyped way to certain specific stimuli in the environment. Jung comes close to this when he writes: 'There is no human experience, nor would experience be possible at all, without the intervention of a subjective aptitude. What is this subjective aptitude? Ultimately it consists in an innate psychic structure which allows man to have experiences of this kind. Thus the whole nature of man presupposes woman, both physically and spiritually. His system is tuned in to woman from the start, just as it is prepared for a quite definite world where there is water, light, air, salt, carbohydrates, etc. The form of the world into which he is born is already inborn in him as virtual images, as psychic aptitudes. These *a priori* categories have by nature a collective character: they are images of parents, wife, and children in general, and are not indi-

vidual predestinations."

What Jung claims to have done is to have isolated these images from individual experience by his technique of comparing myths from differing cultures. Although an archetype may be ultimately indefinable in itself, one can get some idea of it if one accumulates enough different manifestations of it cross-culturally and in different periods of history. This accounts for one difficulty with which the reader is faced in tackling the *Collected Works of Jung*. Jung has a tendency to pile parallel upon parallel from his very extensive knowledge of myth and comparative religion in such a way that the reader may easily forget what it was that was originally being discussed.

There is no theoretical limit to the number of archetypes; but, in practice, some are more important than others. I have already discussed the archetypal images underlying the child's experience of his actual parents. Just as important as these are the archetypal images underlying a person's experience of the opposite sex. Jung names these images *animus* and *anima*; the former term referring to a woman's image of a man, and the latter to a man's image of a woman. In Jung's writings, the anima plays a more prominent role than the animus, presumably because as a man he found the female image more easily definable. Perhaps the simplest way of approaching the concept is by way of the common human experience of falling in love. When a man becomes passionately infatuated with a commonplace girl, his friends may say to each other "What on earth does he see in her?" What he sees is, in Jungian terminology, the anima. At one level, the anima is simply a personification of male erotic desire; an image which may become projected upon a real woman, but which may have little to do with the actual nature of the real person. The anima is described not only as being erotically seductive,

but as possessing age-old wisdom; an attribute which at first sight may seem incongruous. Why should wisdom be associated with erotic fascination? One of Jung's favourite illustrations from fiction of what he meant by the anima is Rider Haggard's 'She'. 'She', it will be remembered, is not only spectacularly beautiful, but also an immortal priestess, with access to arcane knowledge and a serene grasp of the esoteric. This idea is not as remote from ordinary experience as may at first appear. If a man is somewhat alienated from emotion and instinct – a common characteristic of schizoid intellectuals – the woman who fascinates him erotically, and leads him back into the human fold by teaching him the 'wisdom of the body' will appear to him to possess a superior, age-old insight. There is a good example to be found in Hermann Hesse's 'Steppenwolf', a character who might be described as the archetype of the alienated man. A quite ordinary young woman who takes pity on his isolation, and seduces him, becomes his initiator into a fantastic psychological progress which ends with his confronting himself as he actually is. (The novels of Hermann Hesse are another example of a happy hunting-ground for Jungians.)

The anima is also described as being a link between conscious and unconscious, or even, on occasion, as a personification of the unconscious. (One of the major obstacles in reading Jung is his multiplicity of ill-formulated definitions for the same thing.) I think this notion of the anima is best grasped by stating that erotic experience can 'open the door' to a world of feeling and emotion which is not necessarily or wholly erotic. We recognize that the person who has never been in love lacks not only experience of the erotic, but also a whole dimension of human understanding. It is through their experience of the erotic that most people become acquainted with 'passion' and the value attaching to

emotion. It is for this reason that, for many people, the erotic relation appears to contain 'the meaning of life' itself.

The animus, woman's image of man, is less easily defined, partly, as I have said, because Jung himself was a man and partly because, according to his account, the animus manifests itself as a multiplicity of male figures rather than a single one. 'Whereas the man has, floating before him, in clear outlines the significant form of a Circe or a Calypso, the animus is better expressed as a bevy of Flying Dutchmen or unknown wanderers from over the sea, never quite clearly grasped, protean, given to persistent and violent motion. These expressions appear especially in dreams, though in concrete reality they can be famous tenors, boxing champions, or great men in far-away, unknown cities.'¹⁰ Ibsen, in 'The Lady from the Sea', has painted a picture of a woman who is unable to make a proper relation with her husband because of an ancient infatuation with a mysterious Stranger, a mariner whom she had briefly encountered on board ship and who then disappeared. The infatuation was consecrated by the couple throwing their rings into the sea – a kind of mystical marriage, *Mysterium Conjunctionis*, as Jung would have called it. The Stranger is a picture of what Jung meant by the animus, or at least one aspect of the figure; and one cannot do better than read 'The Lady from the Sea' if one wants to grasp the notion. At the end of the play, the Stranger himself reappears, and Ellida, the wife, has to choose between her husband and this 'demon lover'; a confrontation not unlike that required by Jung of his patients in analysis. According to Jung, it is only when a man or woman understands, becomes familiar with, and faces these personifications of subjective desire and emotion that they cease to operate as autonomous personalities, in opposition to the conscious will. Jung describes how, in his

own self-analysis, he conducted long conversations with the anima. He also says that, once he had really understood the contents of the unconscious, he no longer needed the anima as intermediary – in other words, that he became more directly in touch with his own inner world of emotion, although he does not put it quite so simply. When Ellida confronts the Stranger, he loses his magical power over her, and she is able to choose to live with, and to love, her own husband in a way which she could not, so long as her phantasy infatuation had her in its grip. Another example of a typical animus figure is Mr Rochester in 'Jane Eyre'. Because he has a secret – his mad wife – and because he is in a superior social position, he appears to Jane as a mysterious figure, who is also dominant and ruthless. We are not told whether, after Jane married him, he continued, in her eyes, to display these attractive qualities. For the animus or anima to be fully projected requires that the recipient of the projection be somewhat remote. Greta Garbo, who of all film stars provided the most apt frame upon which to project anima images, is a case in point. Perhaps deliberately, perhaps because to do so reflected her real nature, she kept herself inaccessible. A close knowledge of Garbo as a real person would have destroyed the possibility of projecting so much upon her.

The anima and animus, then, are personifications of parts of the personality which are in some senses opposed to the conscious ego, and possess certain attributes of the opposite sex. Jung writes of the anima as causing moods, and the animus as producing opinions. By this he means that a man in the grip of emotion tends to become moody, sentimental, and childish, whereas a woman becomes argumentative, irritable, and opinionated.

Jung, true to his generation, believed that the sexes were strongly differentiated psychologically as well as

physically. He would have had little sympathy with 'unisex' or women's liberation; and a recurrent theme throughout his writing is the disastrous effect which he thought universities – especially American universities – had upon the personality of women. He called them 'animus incubators'; by which pejorative phrase he indicated his belief that universities were apt to turn women into inferior imitations of men, making them competitive, argumentative, and full of ideas which they had taken over from men, but never properly grasped. Indeed, the animus, unlike the anima, comes off rather badly in Jung's descriptive writing. Of course, both figures have negative as well as positive aspects. A man 'possessed by the anima' is not a proper man. He is soft, emotional, moody, over-sensitive; not at all what a man should be in Jung's conception. And if this identification with the feminine, or failure to identify with the masculine, went so far that the man was homosexual, Jung did not approve at all. He was notoriously intolerant of male homosexuals. In his writing, it is this negative aspect of the animus which is chiefly stressed. By that I mean that we hear a good deal of women who are identified with, or possessed by, the animus, and who therefore display the irritating characteristics already noted. But we hear rather little about the animus as a positive function relating the ego of the woman to her own unconscious, or putting her in touch with her feelings, as the anima of a man is supposed to do. It is important not to identify oneself with the anima, if one is a man, or with the animus, if one is a woman. Another way of putting this is to say that one should not, in Jung's view, allow emotion to gain the upper hand, or take over the function of the ego. A person possessed by, or overwhelmed by, emotion is not in the right relation to his own inner world. Indeed, Jung went so far as to allege that the primary disturbance in schizophrenia is a violent affect

which disrupts the personality.¹¹

Two points must occur to the critical reader who reflects upon Jung's writings on the animus/anima concept. The first is that, like Freud, Jung found it necessary to postulate an emotional part of the personality as opposed to a more rational part, but that instead of naming the emotional part the 'id' or some such name, his predilection for dividing the mind into separate 'personalities' which we have already noted, led him to adopt a terminology in which mental functions are treated as people. Second, Jung fails to make clear that his descriptions derive from, and are applicable to, human beings who are isolated or who have never achieved a satisfactory relation with the opposite sex. It is perfectly true that men unrelated to women, and women unrelated to men, tend to show some characteristics in their behaviour which might be thought of as belonging to the opposite sex. Women on their own often become rather managing, bossy, and opinionated. Men on their own display 'feminine' traits of fussiness, emotionality, and moodiness. It could be argued that such phenomena are a simple consequence of a lack of sexual satisfaction. If a person's immediate milieu contains no one of the opposite sex with whom to relate and upon whom to project their internal image, the lack of this relation may lead to the person trying to be what is missing in addition to being themselves. The 'natural state' for human beings is surely one in which the individual is in relation with the opposite sex, whether temporarily or permanently: and the lack of such relation must be expected to have some untoward consequences.

It could also be pointed out that persons who have not made adequate relationships with the opposite sex have often failed to do so because of early confusions about the roles of the sexes. It is generally recognized, for example, that to come of a family in which the mother

'wears the trousers' is apt to cause difficulty for children of both sexes. Jung, of course, was perfectly well aware of this; but chose to adopt a terminology which reflects only the ego's relation with 'internal objects' and says very little about actual relations between real human beings. The fact that our human relationships are distorted because we tend to project images upon the other person which derive from inside ourselves, whether these be from the past experience of parents or from other sources, is well recognized by analysts of every school. Analysis, in the practice of other schools, generally proceeds partly by examining the discrepancies between the actual person with whom the patient is in relation and his expectations of them as reflected in his projections. Thus, a man may be irritated with his wife because she differs from the image of his mother to which he hoped she would conform; or because she does not fit in with some other preconceived notion of woman as a seductress, as an inspiration, or even as a good cook. Analysts of other schools, however, do not generally encourage their patients to treat these preconceived notions as persons and to hold conversations with them. This procedure is clearly derived from that adopted by Jung in his own self-analysis.

One wonders what his relation to his own wife was like during this period. He says that the fact that he had a wife and five children kept him sane, as no doubt it did. But I think it could be argued that to distil the idea of the anima from one's own experience argues a considerable degree of emotional disconnection from persons in the environment. What I am suggesting is that the 'normal' person, happily related emotionally to a person of the opposite sex, will not generally be aware of any vast discrepancy between the object of his love, and the 'internal object' of erotic phantasy. Everyone has erotic phantasies; and everyone may be aware that there is

some discrepancy between his phantasies and the persons to whom he is related in reality. The younger a person is, the more likely is this to be the case. The more isolated a person the more will his 'relationships' be with phantasy figures (the temptations of St. Anthony), and the more important will the latter be to him. The completely isolated man has only phantasy figures. It could be argued that the whole concept of the anima and animus arose from the fact that Jung was an emotionally isolated person, as he himself acknowledges in more than one passage. 'As a child I felt myself to be alone, and I am still, because I know things and must hint at things which others apparently know nothing of, and for the most part do not want to know. Loneliness does not come from having no people about one, but from being unable to communicate the things that seem important to oneself, or from holding certain views which others find inadmissible.'²² This hypothesis about how Jung came to formulate his ideas does not, of course, imply that his formulations are wrong. Indeed, it is obvious that there are collective images of each sex, varying from epoch to epoch, and not corresponding in reality to any actual person, but liable to be projected upon public figures who happen to fit into a limited extent, in appearance if not in character, with whatever the Zeitgeist dictates as being ideally masculine or feminine. To discern such images clearly within oneself, however, requires an exceptional degree of detachment from human relationships and the external world; a kind of distillation of the subjective. In an earlier passage, I pointed out that extreme situations such as the plague, or, to take a more recent example, the collapse of the Weimar Republic, resuscitate images of idealized 'saviour' figures who can do no wrong, and wholly bad 'devil' figures who do nothing but evil. In stable conditions these images remain unconscious; but under threat of destruction or loss

of all predictable security, human beings revert to a very early stage in their emotional development in which they both feel threatened by persecutors who are more powerful than they are, and at the same time need protectors who are, hopefully, more powerful than the persecutors. It seems likely that, to become fully cognizant of the anima or animus within oneself, a similar regression must also take place; a regression to that solipsistic, narcissistic stage of development which Freudians postulate as being the infant's condition before he has any real relation with objects in the external world at all. A person who remains in this condition, and who does not maintain contact with the external world is schizophrenic; but, as Jung demonstrated, and as some people report after experience with drugs like LSD, it is possible, though dangerous, to enter a psychotic state and then emerge from it again. In such a state, the images encountered are often but slenderly related to real persons. In 'The Varieties of Psychedelic Experience', the authors describe many subjects as encountering mythological figures and situations closely comparable with those described by Jung.¹⁸

Another archetypal figure to which Jung makes frequent reference is that of the 'shadow'. Jung postulates, with reason, that most human beings are not as virtuous as they appear, either to themselves or to others. We are all more grasping, licentious, greedy, envious – and so on, through all the deadly sins – than we like to think. This is a commonplace observation confirmed daily in the psychotherapist's consulting room. Where Jung differs from analysts of other schools is in claiming that this characteristic of human nature is both universal and personified. In dreams of Europeans, the shadow habitually appears as a figure of the same sex as the dreamer, but usually dark-skinned, 'devilish', or in some sense felt to be evil. Jung maintained that both Freudian and

Adlerian analysts were principally engaged with the 'shadow-side' of human nature; since they were concerned with exploring the primitive, selfish drives of sexuality on the one hand, and power on the other. It is certainly true that such a figure does sometimes appear in dreams. In one example known to the author, the dreamer encountered an Indian boy-prince for whom he felt intense loathing, but who insisted on embracing him, after which the figure disappeared. The dream might be taken as signifying the dreamer's attempt to come to terms with a homosexual component in himself, and also with other 'shadow' elements, ruthlessness, violence, and the like. But Jung is not at all clear in his discussion of how far the 'shadow' is really a collective figure, and how far personal. He writes: 'We are no longer aware that in carnival customs and the like there are remnants of a collective shadow figure which prove that the personal shadow is in part descended from a numinous collective figure.'¹⁹ But what this collective figure might be is not clearly defined. The shadow is perhaps no more than a personification arising from the infantile tendency, already discussed, to divide persons into black and white categories; gods and devils, virgins and witches. This tendency is enshrined in creative productions of a rather unsophisticated kind like the old-fashioned Western or the detective stories of Conan Doyle. In works of this genre, the villains are wholly wicked, and the heroes impossibly virtuous; an incorruptible Sherlock Holmes confronts a Moriarty who is a 'Napoleon of crime'.

Rather similar criticisms may be brought to bear on Jung's concept of the 'wise old man'; an archetypal figure who appeared to him in his own self-analysis as Elijah, and later developed into the character called Philemon mentioned in the first chapter of this book. The wise old man represents 'the factor of intelligence and knowledge or superior insight'. But it is not at all

obvious, from Jung's account, in what way this figure differs from a father-figure, or even from an image of God. Moreover, it may be remembered that, at the age of twelve, Jung had already conceived the idea that there was a second personality within him, an 'old man' of great authority. Everyone knows that, if one is faced with a problem or moral dilemma, there is a limit to what conscious thinking can achieve. A period of waiting, or 'sleeping on it', may well bring a solution which conscious striving failed to find; and in this way, illumination is felt by the subject to have come to him from a source beyond consciousness. The wise old man appears to be Jung's personification of this common human experience.

Before leaving the subject of archetypes, some reference must be made to the concept of the *persona*. This term is derived from the Latin for the mask assumed by actors, and is used by Jung to designate the role played by an individual in accordance with the expectations of society, as opposed to what the person is in reality. A man may become identified with his role, to the detriment of his personality. Thus, a judge may be always a judge, a doctor invariably a professional healer, or a minister may never lay aside his robes. It is a phenomenon frequently encountered in social life. In the sense that it is partly society which demands role-playing, the phenomenon of the *persona* may be labelled as a collective one. Society lays down how a judge should be, and how a minister of religion should behave. The *persona* is sometimes contrasted with the shadow, and sometimes with the *animus* or *anima*: which is simply a way of saying that those who are identified with their social role are generally those who are unaware of their own anti-social impulses, and out of touch with their own inner feelings. The most important archetype, the Self, will be

discussed in a subsequent chapter on the individuation process.

In his description of archetypes and the collective unconscious, Jung may be said to have anticipated the point of view of those psychoanalysts who write in terms of an inner world of 'internal objects'. Jung may well be right in alleging that the characteristics of these figures are not directly derived from infantile experience, but are the result of inborn predisposition; the nature of man himself. More cross-cultural studies are needed which would critically compare, for example, the figures of the witch or the *Magna Mater* as they have appeared in the mythology of different peoples. The existence of an inner world of archetypal figures is not in doubt, although analysts would disagree as to its origin. Nor is the fact that, at least under special circumstances, behaviour is influenced by this inner world. In recent years, we have grown used to the assumption, borne out by animal studies, that the experiences of earliest infancy may have a permanent effect upon later adaptation. Many archetypal figures as described by Jung are closely similar to the figures of infantile phantasy, as analysts of other schools might name them. And there would be general agreement that it is under conditions of stress, whether induced by external disaster, or by internal emotional upheaval, that reason is overborne, and a person's conduct becomes governed by the dominants of his inner world. In trying to understand these phenomena, Jung's model is probably more fruitful for research than that of the Kleinians; since, by drawing attention to the similarities between the mythologies of different times and different cultures, Jung has provided a basis for comparative studies.